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Background: ​During the Covid-19 lockdown, contact clustering in social bubbles may allow 
extending contacts beyond the household at minimal additional risk and hence has been 
considered as part of modified lockdown policy or a gradual lockdown exit strategy. We 
estimated the impact of such strategies on epidemic and mortality risk using the UK as a 
case study. 
Methods: ​We used an individual based model for a synthetic population similar to the UK, that is 
stratified into transmission risks from the community, within the household and from other 
households in the same social bubble. The base case considers a situation where 
non-essential shops and schools are closed, the secondary household attack rate is 20% 
and the initial reproduction number is 0.8. We simulate a number of strategies including 
variations of social bubbles, i.e. the forming of exclusive pairs of households, for particular 
subsets of households (households including children and single occupancy households), as 
well as for all households. We test the sensitivity of the results to a range of alternative 
model assumptions and parameters. 
Results: ​Clustering contacts outside the household into exclusive social bubbles is an effective 
strategy of increasing contacts while limiting some of the associated increase in epidemic 
risk. In the base case scenario social bubbles reduced cases and fatalities by 17% 
compared to an unclustered increase of contacts. We find that if all households were to form 
social bubbles the reproduction number would likely increase to 1.1 and therefore beyond 
the epidemic threshold of one. However, strategies that allow households with young 
children or single occupancy households to form social bubbles only increased the 
reproduction number by less than 10%. The corresponding increase in morbidity and 
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mortality is proportional to the increase in the epidemic risk but is largely focussed in older 
adults independently of whether these are included in the social bubbles. 
Conclusions: ​Social bubbles can be an effective way of extending contacts beyond the 
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Background 
In the UK, similar to many other countries, the introduction of stringent physical distancing 
measures in March 2020 in response to the Covid-19 pandemic has reduced the transmission 
of SARS-CoV-19 and alleviated the burden on the healthcare system ​1,2​. This reduction, 
however, has come at great economic, societal, and wider health costs ​3–6​. With infection 
incidence on the decline, countries must now strike a balance between easing restrictions in an 
attempt to reduce the societal burden while making sure that the epidemic remains under 
control ​7–11​.  
 
Multiple options, that could in combination form an exit strategy, have been proposed to allow 
easing of restrictions. These include: the widespread use of rapid, potentially app-based, 
contact tracing in combination with rapid testing and self-isolation ​12,13​; expanded random testing 
to increase detection of asymptomatic infection ​14–16​; strict quarantining of travellers on arrival 
17,18​; and the use of face masks in high-risk environments ​19–22​. Another potential component of a 
lockdown exit strategy that could allow for greater social interaction is the clustering of contacts 
beyond the household, commonly referred to as the social bubble or the ‘double bubble’ 
strategy ​23–27​. Under this strategy, households would be allowed to form a cohesive unit with one 
other household, generating a ‘social bubble’; this would allow individuals to increase their 
close, physical social interactions beyond their household while potentially limiting the risk of 
infection through the exclusivity of the bubble. A similar strategy has been implemented in some 
countries, including New Zealand and Germany, and is currently considered as part of the 
lockdown exit strategy in the UK ​28​.  
 
While physical distancing has placed additional pressures on society as a whole, some 
households are likely to be disproportionately more at risk of social isolation. Many adults in the 
UK will have been able to partially shift social contacts online and since 11th May (and 1st June) 
have been allowed to socialise outdoors with a maximum of one (and subsequently up to five) 
others while adhering to distancing guidelines ​29​. However, such social contact replacements 
can be more difficult for children, for whom verbal interaction is only a small part of their 
communication with peers. Further, their carers have often had to balance working from home, 
childcare and homeschooling, generally without being able to access a support network from 
family, friends or professional childminders ​30​. Single occupancy and single parent households 
have also likely been disproportionately affected as the complete absence of social face-to-face 
interactions for many months may impact mental wellbeing ​31,32​. 
 
Here, using mathematical models, we assess the likely increase in transmission generated by 
various plausible social bubble strategies and use the UK as a case study. In particular, we 
compare the impact of limiting bubbles to those households who would benefit most (single 
occupancy households and those with young children) with allowing all households to form 
bubbles. We assess these changes in terms of both the increase in transmission (as 
characterised by the reproductive ratio, ​R​) and short-term increase in fatalities.  
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Methods 
Population 
The model’s synthetic population was created by generating individuals who are residents of 
one of 10,000 households. The size of the individual households, as well as the age distribution 
within households, was sampled to match that observed in the most recent census in England 
and Wales in 2011 (Figure 1) ​33​.  
 
Transmission model 
The transmission dynamics are set to simulate the status of Covid-19 interventions during 
‘lockdown’ in the UK in May 2020, in particular simulating contacts that are substantially 
reduced and largely household-based, with schools, non-essential retail, and leisure facilities 
closed. This is achieved through stochastic simulation of infections spreading through an 
interconnected population; connections are captured by a matrix, ​A,​ which defines the 
probability that infection can pass between any two individuals in the population. ​A​ is composed 
of the sum of two matrices ​H ​ and ​B​, which capture within-household and within-bubble 
transmission respectively (Figure 1). We can then use the matrix ​A ​to drive forwards the 
stochastic dynamics using a next generation approach. To this, we add random (mean-field) 
transmission between individuals in the population to simulate the risk that infection in the wider 
community poses to the household and the social bubble, and vice versa (Table S1). 
Transmission rates within the household and the wider community are matched to observed 
data on secondary attack rates and population-scale R estimates. We assume that households 
are adhering to current restrictions and social distancing, and therefore largely act as a coherent 
and largely isolated unit. We therefore assume that the risk of a household acquiring infection 
from the community is independent of its number of occupants as observed in a cross sectional 
serological study for SARS-CoV-2 in Germany in March and April 2020 ​34​.  
 
We define a baseline household transmission rate, τ​H​, as the transmission rate between adults 
in a two-person household. To this baseline we assume that the susceptibility to infection, ​C​, as 
well as transmissibility of infection, ​T, ​ can be age dependent. There are two conflicting bodies 
of evidence about the potential role of children. Firstly,  it has been observed that children are 
more likely to experience mild or no symptoms, and as such may have a lower transmission rate 
35,36​ (Table S2). Secondly, cases with more severe symptoms are likely to self-isolate reducing 
their effective infectious period, therefore children that are asymptomatic (or mildly symptomatic) 
may continue to transmit for longer ​34​. In our base parameterisation, we assume that children 
are 50% as susceptible to infection as adults or elderly adults, but assume that transmissibility is 
independent of age; this echoes the assumptions of a previous model [33], but an alternative 
parameterisation based on other work [8] is considered as part of sensitivity analysis. We 
assume that transmission within households and across households who share a bubble is 
frequency dependent, i.e. the person-to-person transmission rate within households and across 
households who share a bubble is inversely proportional to the number of other people in an 
individual’s household or bubble ​34,37,38​.  
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Throughout, we compare the baseline model without the additional social interactions via 
bubbles (C1) with different ways in which bubbles could be allowed to form (scenarios 1-6, see 
below). To assess the effectiveness of social bubbles, compared to increasing contacts in an 
unclustered fashion, we consider two further comparison scenarios. In C2, individuals form the 
same number of additional contacts with the population as in Scenario 6, but these are chosen 
randomly across the population. In C3, the community transmission rate is increased to match 
the total increase in the transmission rate in Scenario 6. Scenario 6, C2, and C3 therefore 
represent fixed and clustered, fixed and unclustered, and variable additional contacts 
respectively.  
 
For a technical summary of the model and its assumptions, see the supplemental material.   
 
Outcome metrics 
We calculate two key metrics for the epidemiological impact of interventions in our household 
model with extended social contacts, which relate to epidemic risk and adverse health 
measures.  
 
The net reproduction number (​R​) is a measure of risk for (increased) transmission that may  
eventually result in an exponential increase in infections and hence the need for stricter control 
measures if exceeding the epidemic threshold (​R>1​). ​R ​ is defined as the number of secondary 
infections generated by a typical case. In models incorporating household structure, the typical 
case is effectively an average over the probability that such a case is the first, second, third or 
later generation case within the household. Following the principle of Pellis et al. ​39,40​, we 
determine ​R​ numerically as the ratio of the number of new infections in the fifth to the fourth 
model generation, adjusted to account for the partial depletion of susceptibles. In all simulations 
this provided sufficient time for the average state of infectious individuals to have stabilised 
without a notable depletion of susceptibles in the overall population (Supplementary Figure S1).  
 
Our second metric is the relative mortality (i.e. number of deaths), compared to the baseline 
model (C1) of isolated households; this provides a measure of adverse health impacts as a 
result of increased contact rates in the respective scenarios. We use age stratified infection 
fatality rates (IFR) estimated from repatriation flights early in the Covid-19 pandemic ​41,42​ to 
predict the mortality risk in the five generations following model burn in (i.e. from the fourth to 




To parameterise the Covid-19 transmission dynamics in the model we need to define the 
infection dynamics within a household, within a bubble and from the community. To 
parameterise the within household transmission we assume that, in line with observations from 
contact tracing while accounting for some underreporting ​43–45​, the secondary household attack 
rate (SAR​HH​) is 20%. This is achieved by tuning the transmission rate (​τ​H​) between household 
members to achieve this average attack rate. We subsequently assume that community 
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transmission is such that, in combination with household transmission, the model generates an 
overall reproduction number of 0.8, similar to estimates from mid-May 2020 in the UK ​46,47​. 
Further, as a base-case, we assume that transmission between households within the same 
bubble is 50% lower than that within a household, i.e. ​τ​B​ = ½ * τ ​H​. In our base case 
parameterisation a 3.2-fold increase in community contacts yielded a reproduction number of 
about 2.5; this is in line with an approximate 70% reduction in contacts during lockdown and a 
reproduction number of about 2.5 in the early phase of the pandemic with hardly any distancing 
measures in place ​46​. 
 
We additionally assume that all eligible households would take up the opportunity to expand 
their contacts and enter into a social bubble with one other household, and that they would 
adhere to the exclusivity of this bubble. The impact of only partial uptake is explored in the 
Supplementary Figure S2, where we find that the increase in ​R​ scales approximately linearly 
with uptake. The impact of adherence, incorporated by allowing 50% of eligible households to 
form an additional social bubble, is explored in our sensitivity analyses (Figure 4; 
Supplementary Figure S3-S7). 
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Figure 1​: top panel: schematic of model structure and its stratification into different household sizes with three 
components of transmission dynamics, community transmission, bubble transmission and 
household transmission; left panel: household size distribution for all households in England and 
Wales, for those households with at least one child younger than 20 years old and for those with at 
least one child younger than 10 years old (about primary school age and younger). Right panel: 
illustrative transmission probability matrix ​A ​, composed of household and bubble contacts and 




We considered a number of contact clustering strategies of how bubbles could be allowed under 
any relaxation to lockdown measures: 
1) Allow households with children younger than 10 years old (about primary school age or 
younger) to pair up 
2) Allow households with children younger than 20 years old to pair up 
3) Allow single occupancy households to pair up with another single occupancy household 
4) Allow single occupancy households to pair up with another household of any size 
5) A combination of scenarios 1 & 3 
6) Allow all households to pair up with one other household 
All these scenarios assume that the pairing will occur at random between permitted households.  
 
We compare the above scenarios against three counterfactuals that do not include social 
bubbles. These allows us to elucidate the impact of  
C1) Perfect adherence to the current household-only contact strategy (other than the 
background transmission risk from the community) 
C2) All individuals increase their number of contacts so that population level force of 
infection matches that of Scenario 6. Contacts are unclustered and chosen at random 
across the population but stay the same over time. 
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C3) All individuals increase their number of contacts so that population level force of 
infection matches that of Scenario 6. Contacts are unclustered and chosen at random 
across the population and are re-sampled at each generation.  
Counterfactuals 2 and 3, maintain the same level of additional contacts outside the home as 




Other than the previously described base case we performed a number of univariate sensitivity 
analyses to test the robustness of our findings to the underlying assumptions. Specifically, we 
assume that the current ​R ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8 ​47​; that the secondary attack rate in the 
household is 10% or 40% instead of 20% ​ ​44​; that transmission between individuals in the same 
bubble (but different households) is 10% or 100% of that within a household instead of 50%; 
that the risk of a household to get infected with SARS-CoV-2 from the community increases with 
increasing household size instead of being independent; that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to 
the recommendations but also form bubbles with an additional household rather than perfect 
adherence; and that the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared 






From the 2011 census of England and Wales, the average size of a household was 2.32 
persons. Considering households with at least one child under 10, the average household size 
increases to 3.77 persons, and 29.3% of the population live in such households. For households 
with at least one child under 20, the average household size is 3.65 persons, and 48.5% live in 
such households. In total, only 15% of households are occupied by someone over the age of 
60, although 50% of single occupancy households were occupied by such older adults. There is 
limited multi-generational mixing, with only 3% of households having both a child under 10 and 
an adult over 60. 
 
 
Impact of social bubble strategies on epidemic risk 
Assuming an initial reproduction number of 0.8, perfect adherence to the recommended social 
bubble strategy and that all eligible households indeed pair up, we find that strategies that 
exclusively target single person households (scenario 3) or households with young children 
(scenario 1) do not increase transmission substantially (​R​ of 0.84 and 0.86 respectively in the 
base case scenario); their combination (scenario 5) is also predicted to only marginally increase 
transmission in the community (​R ​of 0.90) (Figure 2). For these two targeted strategies, even 
under conservative assumptions (SAR​HH​ = 40%, τ​H​ =  τ​B​), the increase in transmission is unlikely 
to lead to substantial spread of Covid-19 (​R​ of 0.89 and 1.01 for scenario 1 and 3, respectively). 
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However, allowing all households to form bubbles (scenario 6) is estimated to increase the 
reproduction number to 1.09 and hence substantially beyond the critical threshold value of 1 for 




Figure 2​: Estimated reproduction number and increase in fatalities for the considered scenarios under the 
assumption that all eligible households pair up and thereby form exclusive social bubbles and that 
transmission rates within a social bubble are the same as within the household. Central estimates 
are assuming SAR​HH​=20% and the upper and lower limits represent the respective 10% and 40% 
assumption. 
 
Generally, the fewer households that were deemed eligible for expanding their social bubble 
under a specific strategy, the smaller the average household size of those involved, the smaller 
the uptake (see Supplementary Figure S2) and the smaller the risk for transmission within the 
bubble, the smaller the increase in transmission as a result.  
 
 
The impact of social bubble strategies on mortality risk 
The average age in the households eligible to form social bubbles in scenarios 1 to 6 was 22.2, 
25.8, 58.7, 41.0, 33.5, and 40.2 years, hence the average infection fatality risk in an average 
household member implementing such a strategy was 0.10%, 0.14%, 2.49%, 1.08%, 0.84%, 
and 0.97%. In all scenarios, the increased number of contacts lead to both excess infections 
and fatalities. Excess risk for infection compared with no social bubbles (Scenario C1) was seen 
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in households implementing the social bubbles as well as those households who were not 
eligible, although, as expected, the relative risk for infection was higher in eligible households 
(Figure 3). The resulting excess mortality risk depended highly on the estimated epidemic risk 
but also on the average age of the affected households. For example, social bubbles among 
households with young children (Scenario 1) and among single occupancy households 
(Scenario 3) led to similar increases in infections, risk ratio of 1.64 and 1.50, respectively, in the 
base case scenario. While the resulting overall increase in mortality risk was similar in both 
scenarios (Figure 2) the mortality risk in Scenario 1 was largely attributed to households not 
eligible to form social bubbles (Figure 3) 
 
The forming of social bubbles was effective at reducing the infection and thereby the mortality 
risk compared to strategies that increased contacts in a less clustered way: under base case 
assumptions all households forming social bubbles (Scenario 6) reduced the mortality risk by 
7.5% and 17.1% compared to adding the same amount of contacts randomly (Scenario C2) and 
time varying (Scenario C3). 
 
 
Figure 3​: Relative risk of infection and fatality. Left panel: the relative risks for infection in the considered scenarios if 
compared to the status quo with no social bubbles ( Scenario C1) , stratified into the risks in 
households eligible and not eligible for forming social bubbles. Right panel: the population 
attributable fraction of fatalities in the considered scenarios. The overall mortality risk is stratified 




We tested the robustness of our findings to a number of alternative assumptions governing the 
spread of SARS-CoV-2 and the implementation of the social bubble strategy. Within the tested 
parameter space, the alternative assumptions did not qualitatively change our findings. The two 
main factors that increased or decreased the epidemic risk were an initial value of ​R ​closer to 
one when implementing the strategy and a much higher than typically observed secondary 
household attack rate. However for strategies 1 and 3, in neither of the univariately tested 
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scenarios did ​R​ exceed one (Figure 4 & Supplementary Figure S3). The assumptions on age 
stratified susceptibility and transmissibility were conservative for strategies focussed on 
households with children and were optimistic for single-person households; and vice versa for 
the assumption that the risk for community transmission was independent of household size 
(Supplementary Figures S3-S7). The epidemic risk from social bubbles is further reduced if 
within bubble transmission is reduced to 10% of that within household transmission. 
 
The effectiveness of social bubbles also varied according to the Scenario considered and the 
parametric assumptions and was as large as a 27.2% and a 70.0% reduction in mortality risk 
compared to adding the same amount of contacts randomly (Scenario C2) and time varying 
(Scenario C3), under base case parameters except for the age dependent susceptibility and 
infectivity of cases. 
 
 
Figure 4​: Sensitivity analyses. The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase 
in fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario 1, i.e. allowing households with young 
children to pair up. Increases over the base case estimate are shown in orange and decreases in 
blue. The base case estimate is indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity 
scenarios are (from top to bottom): transmission across individuals of households sharing a bubble 
is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 50%; the relative susceptibility to 
infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 125% while the relative 
transmissibility is 64% and 290%; the secondary attack rate in the household is 10% or 40% 
instead of 20%; ​R​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8; that 50% of bubbles not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to form bubbles with four households, rather than perfect adherence; 
and that the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household 
size instead of being the same across households. 
 
Discussion 
We found that contact clustering, or the forming of social bubbles that join two households, can 
allow increased social contacts beyond the households while limiting additional risk for 
transmission. In the base case social bubbles reduced the mortality risk by 17% compared to a 
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scenario that increased contacts by the same amount but without clustering thereof, and risk 
reduction under some alternative parameterisations was even higher. Allowing all households to 
form social bubbles may increase the reproduction number above its epidemic threshold and 
hence lead to an increase in cases. A strategy that sees only those at potentially the highest 
need for an extension of their contacts beyond the household (families with young children and 
single-person households) should lead to a limited increase in epidemic risk (less than 10% 
individually and less than 15% in combination) which remained below the epidemic threshold in 
most scenarios considered. The epidemic risk can be further reduced if the transmission risk 
within the bubble is minimised. As the number of contacts and ​R ​increase with a social bubble 
strategy, so does the risk of adverse health outcomes. We find that adverse health outcomes 
are largely proportional to the epidemic risk, but will disproportionately affect households with 
older adults independently of their clustering behaviour.  
 
Stringent physical distancing policies in many countries have reduced the reproduction number 
from about 2.5 to just under 1 ​11,46,51​. This provides the opportunity to risk a small amount of 
additional contacts without necessarily experiencing an increase in Covid-19 cases, if crossing 
the epidemic threshold can be avoided. Here, we investigate the effectiveness of social bubbles 
as a potential option to ease the social impact of the lockdown without increasing transmission 
risks. However, while we here look at the impact of social bubbles in isolation these would only 
be part of a multi-variable exit strategy ​28​. Hence, our comparisons of alternative bubble 
strategies against the epidemic threshold should be interpreted cautiously and in consideration 
of the other changes to behaviour, such as re-opening of non-essential retail and travel. It is 
likely that these other activities will combine in a non-linear manner so that bubbling in a context 
of children returning to school might affect results.  
 
Countries including Germany and New Zealand have implemented strategies similar to those 
considered here. In Bavaria, Germany, in early May and before the reopening of schools and 
nurseries, up to three households could form exclusive groups to share childcare amongst them 
52​. Even during their highest national alert level, level 4 “Lockdown”, New Zealand permitted 
people living alone to pair up with a “lockdown buddy” and key workers to identify “childcare 
buddies”. New Zealand moved to level 3 in their Covid-19 alert system, “Restrict”, on 27 April 
2020 which included the advice to residents to stay within their household bubbles but permitted 
expansion of such to reconnect with close family, bring in caregivers or support isolated people 
53​. A subsequent survey found that among respondents the highest increase in the quality of life 
by far would not be brought by re-opening of schools, shops, churches or fitness centres, but by 
allowing households to re-connect ​54​. It also found that in going to alert level 3 only 50% of 
households took up the opportunity to expand their social bubbles and that there was high 
awareness of the importance of the exclusivity of the bubbles, with only 7.5% of bubbles 
reporting to have had contacts outside their bubble.  
 
We identify three key risks to the success of social bubbles that may increase their 
epidemiological risk: potential lack of adherence, a higher than observed secondary household 
attack rate and being too close to the epidemic threshold. If the risk perception of the population 
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changes as a result of allowing parts of the population to form social clusters, a lack of 
adherence to the exclusivity of the bubbles could lead to rebuilding of contact networks that in 
turn lead to the epidemic threshold being crossed. We find that some degree of non-adherence 
would not necessarily hinder the success of the strategy, but communication of the strategy is 
likely to be key. For example, in New Zealand, the social bubbles were not framed as a 
relaxation of social distancing rules but rather as a source of support for those who are at a 
higher risk of social isolation or with needs for care, including childcare ​54​. We find that if the 
secondary household attack rate is substantially higher than assumed in our base case the 
epidemic risk is elevated close to the epidemic threshold. While high household attack rates 
have been observed in some instances, our base case assumptions are in line with an 
increasingly consistent picture emerging in the academic literature ​44​. Also, superspreading 
events have been raised as a potentially important source for sustained transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2, which would further imply a rather low secondary household attack rate in most 
instances ​55,56​. Similarly, if the reproduction number is very close to its epidemic threshold, an 
increase in contacts, even if clustered, could result in an increase in cases. Hence, careful 
monitoring of such is needed to assess the feasibility of expanding social bubbles.  
 
An expansion of contacts into social bubbles will naturally lead to some increase in transmission 
in comparison to perfect adherence to the recommendation to restrict to all but essential 
contacts outside the household. However, such adherence may decline as a result of extended 
periods of time in lockdown and lead to an expansion of contacts that are unclustered, 
potentially leading to long chains of transmission. To illustrate such a scenario, we include 
alternative comparisons for the strategy that allows all households to form social bubbles 
(Scenario 6). We considered strategies that would have the same overall increase in 
transmission as in that scenario but where either the contacts or not cluster but stay fixed over 
time (Scenario C2) or where contacts are not clustered and vary over time (Scenario C3). We 
show that the clustering slightly reduces the epidemic and reduces the number of infections and 
subsequent fatalities by 5% and 17% in the base case and even more in some of the parametric 
sensitivity analysis. Hence social bubbles, if given as a guidance to households who are 
struggling to cope with the lockdown, may give these households a safer alternative and thereby 
help to reduce the epidemic and mortality risk. This may particularly be the case for households 
with single parents or parents who cannot easily work from home; in such circumstances 
allowing social bubbles may help increase equity in the impact of the lockdown.  
 
Our analyses have a number of limitations. Firstly, we only assessed the risk of extending social 
bubbles but not the benefits. As of June 2020 in England, social contact beyond the immediate 
household is restricted to virtual contact or contact in open spaces with up to 5 individuals while 
keeping 2 meters apart. In other words, one can have a conversation. While conversations are a 
large part of the social contacts of adults they have little role in the social interactions of young 
children. Hence the benefit of extending bubbles for children is likely disproportionately higher. 
Furthermore, clustering contacts into social bubbles is likely to ease contact tracing which is an 
integral part of both containment and lockdown exit strategies. We considered social bubbles 
against the background of a lockdown, particularly where schools are closed. As lockdown 
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measures are eased and schools are gradually re-opened forming social bubbles that largely 
overlap with societal one (for example forming social clusters with families that have children 
going to the same class) is likely further reducing the additional epidemic risk from social 
bubbles. We also did not include the possibility to form bigger social bubbles that would cluster 
together 3 or more households. While this has been implemented in other countries, the 
complexity of creating an exclusive cluster of three or more households could lead to a loss of 
adherence. We did not consider further heterogeneity of the society. This may include that 
about 20% of the working population is classified as key workers and will have an increased risk 
for infection from the community, or that families with lower socioeconomic status have been hit 
disproportionally hard by the lockdown. Further, we also did not consider age-homogeneous 
mixing when pairing up single occupancy households and subsets of such strategies, that may 
exclude high risk individuals and thereby reduce the mortality risks in that strategy.. 
 
Conclusions 
Our analyses highlight the continued need for social distancing despite a social bubble strategy 
being an effective way to expand contacts while limiting the risk for a resurgence of cases. 
Recommending social bubbles only for those who particularly struggle with the lockdown, while 
minimising opportunities for spread through prioritising outdoor settings for gathers and 
adhering to distancing recommendations as possible, may strike an effective balance between 
minimising the impact on mental health and minimising the epidemic Covid-19 risk. 
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Further details on the methods 
In this study we use a stochastic network simulation model to assess the impact of social 
bubbles. Here, we describe the model in detail. Table S1 describes our notation, while Table S2 
contains the formulae for transmission rates within our model. 
 
Table S1: ​Model notation 
Symbol Meaning 
a​i Age group of an individual ​i​, ​a ​i​ ​∊ {Child, Adult, Older adult} 
C(a) Age-dependent susceptibility scaling factor  
T(a) Age-dependent transmissibility scaling factor  
N​H​(i) Number of individuals in an individual i’s household 
N​B​(i) Number of additional individuals in an individual ​i​’s bubble outside of their 
household, i.e. the size of household joined to 
τ​H Baseline transmission rate across household contact 
⍴​H​(i,j) Household transmission rate from individual ​j​ to individual ​i 
τ​B Baseline transmission rate across bubble contact,​ τ​B​ = ​cτ ​H​ where ​c​ ∊ [0 1] 
⍴​B​(i,j) Bubble transmission rate from individual ​j​ to individual ​i 
ε Baseline mean-field transmission rate  
ε(i) Mean-field transmission rate to an individual ​i 
I(g) Vector of infection statuses of individuals at generation g (including those who have 
now recovered) 
I(g) [I ​a​(g)] Number of infected individuals [of age ​a​] at generation ​g​. 
S(g) Number of susceptible individuals at generation ​g​. 
N  Size of population.  
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Table S2: ​Transmission rates 
 
Transmission rate Model formulation 
Household, ​⍴​H​(i,j) if ​i ​ and ​j​ are within the same household, 0 otherwiseN (i) − 1H
T (a )C(a )τj i H  
Bubble, ​⍴​B​(i,j)  if ​i ​ and ​j ​are within the same bubble (but not the sameN (i)B
T (a )C(a ) τj i B  
household), 0 otherwise 
Mean-field, ​ε(i) C(a )εi
N (i) NH
(a)(I (g) I (g ))∑
 
a
T a −  a − 1  
 
The baseline household transmission rate, ​τ​H​, is defined as the transmission rate between 
adults in a household of size two. Similarly, the baseline bubble transmission rate, ​τ​B​, is defined 
as the transmission rate between households in a bubble consisting of two adults. Specific 
transmission rates across household (or bubble) contacts are inversely proportional to the 
number of other people in an individual’s household (to the number of people in an individual’s 
bubble). They also depend upon the transmissibility of the individual ​j ​transmitting infection 
(T(a ​j ​)), and upon the susceptibility of the individual ​i ​receiving infection (C(a ​i ​)), which are 
dependent on the age classes of individuals ​j ​and ​i​. The mean-field transmission to an individual 
is inversely proportional to the number of individuals in their household, as we assume that a 
household acts as a coherent and largely self-contained unit when interacting with the 
population at large. ​ε(i) ​also depends on the susceptibility of ​i​, determined by their age class. 
The force of infection from the general population is given by ΣT(a)(I​a​(g) - I​a​(g-1)), i.e. the new 
infections in generation g of each age class a, scaled by the relative transmissibility of that age 
class.  
 
By considering transmission as a Poisson process, we obtain the elements of the probability 
matrices H and B, the matrices of within household and within bubble transmissions 
respectively, by taking H(i,j) =  1-e ​-⍴H(i,j) ​ and B(i,j) = 1-e ​-⍴B(i,j)​ . A non-zero element within the 
matrix H (or B) indicates that the corresponding individuals are within the same household (or 
bubble). We obtain the overall probability matrix for the population by taking A = H+B. 
 
In order to simulate an epidemic, we begin by randomly sampling the probability matrix A. Doing 
so, we retain only the infectious connections between individuals that will lead to an infection. 
We refer to the sampled matrix as A’.  A’(i,j) = 1 denotes that individual ​j​ will infect individual ​i 
with probability 1, given individual ​j​ is infected. We initiate each simulation with 100 infectious 
individuals chosen uniformly at random from the population. Letting ​I(g)​ be the vector of 
infection statuses of individuals in generation ​g​, we obtain the next generation by ​I(g+1)​ = 
sign((A’+Id)’* ​I(g)​), where Id is the identity matrix, and where sign() is an element-wise function 
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equal to 1 for each positive element and 0 otherwise. Via this matrix multiplication, every newly 
infected individual in generation ​g​ infects all of their infectious contacts that generation. Here the 
identity matrix is added to impose that individuals do not become susceptible again after one 
generation, while the sign function is used to impose that individuals cannot be infected more 
than once. This process can be iterated until equilibrium is reached, and the epidemic has 
ended. To this, we also add mean-field transmission. Each generation, the number of new 
infections is calculated in order to calculate ​ε(i)​ for each susceptible individual i, who is infected 
from mean field transmission with probability 1 - e ​ε(i)​ each generation. 
 
Recovery from infection is not explicitly modelled in the simulation, but rather is implicitly built 
into the structure of the model. If an individual ​i​ is infected in generation g, they will infect all of 
their transmission contacts in generation ​g​+1 via the matrix multiplication. They also only 
contribute to community infection in generation ​g​+1. While individual ​i​ remains ‘infected’ (with 
value 1), they no longer play any role in the infection dynamics, nor can they be reinfected. 
Hence, the simulation model assumes that individuals are infectious for one generation, before 
recovering with immunity. 
 
Results are averages obtained from simulations of 100 epidemics for 10 different sampled 
epidemic networks, hence results are averages of 1000 simulations.  
 
While in this study, we consider households and the effect of introducing bubbles to an 
epidemic, and consider three age classes (children, adults, and older adults), our simulation 
methods are general, and could be used for an arbitrary probability matrix with an arbitrary 
number of risk classes. The simulation model and analyses from this study are available via 
github on ​github.com/tsleng93/SocialBubble ​. 
 
The social bubble strategy works under the assumption that bubbles are exclusive. We model 
non-adherence to the strategy by allowing 50% of eligible households to enter into close contact 
with an additional household. Doing so means that bubbles are no longer mutually exclusive, 
and that chains of transmission could potentially span many households. Letting B​2 ​denote the 
probability matrix of additional bubbles through non-adherence, A is now obtained by the sum of 
H, B, and B​2​. 
 
As well as comparing our results to the baseline scenario where households do not form 
bubbles, we also consider two counterfactual situations, C2 and C3, where individuals have 
increased their social contacts by an equivalent amount to Scenario 6 (where all households 
have entered into social bubbles). In C2, we consider a situation where each individual has the 
same number of fixed additional contacts as in Scenario 6, but contacts are chosen at random 
across the population instead of being concentrated in one another household. The rate matrix 
B for C2 is obtained by taking the rate matrix B for Scenario 6, and swapping links with 
probability 1.  
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In C3, we consider a situation where each individual has increased their number of contacts, 
and that these contacts are not necessarily fixed. This is achieved by increasing each 
individual’s rate of mean-field transmission to match the additional rate of transmission included 
from bubble contacts in scenario 6. This new rate of mean-field transmission, ε*, is given by 





ε (i) (i) ρ (i, )* =   ∑
 
i









Rearranging, we can obtain an expression for  ε*: 
 








(a )/N (i) (a ) ∑
 
i






Hence, the total rate of additional transmission to an individual from outside of their immediate 





The primary outcome metric we consider in this paper is the net reproduction number, R. While 
the standard method of calculating ​R​ for is to take the dominant eigenvalue of the next 
generation matrix ​57​, such a method fails when considering a population with households. This 
dominant eigenvalue does not possess the threshold qualities ​R​ implies, and does not account 
for the early local depletion of susceptibles household structure imposes. Accordingly, a variety 
of metrics have been proposed ​58​. However, even in simpler models than ours, the formal 
derivation of ​R​ for households can be involved. Therefore, we take a numerical approach to 
calculating ​R​. We take the ratio between new infected individuals in the fifth and fourth 
generations, adjusted for the depletion of susceptibles. Specifically, defining ​R(g)​ as ​R = 
(I(g+1)/I(g)) x (N/S(g) ​), we take ​R(4)​ as ​R​. We observe that this function ​R​ reaches an 
equilibrium after this many generations, which persists for a number of generations. This is 
demonstrated in Supplementary Figure S1, and for analyses we check that ​R​ has stabilised by 
considering whether ​R(5)​ is within 5% of ​R(4)​. If ​R ​has not stabilised, we rerun the simulation 
with 10, instead of 100, initially infected individuals. 
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Supplementary Figure S1:​ Numerical exploration of ​R​ by generation. Left shows examples of the method for which 
ε was fitted to satisfy ​R(4) ​ = 0.8 under our baseline parameters for different values of SAR​HH​. Right 
shows ​R(g)​ by generation from each of our scenarios from our baseline assumption. In both plots, ​R(g) 
decreases over the first few generations, before  reaching an equilibrium value which persists over 
multiple generations. 
 
We also consider the fatality incidence increase caused by various social bubble intervention 
scenarios. This is calculated as the risk ratio, i.e. the number of deaths given the intervention 
over the number of deaths given no intervention. Deaths were counted over the fifth to the tenth 
generation model, and age dependent case fatality ratios were used to project the number of 




Table S3 ​: Key model parameters and assumptions. 
 





 Household structure and age 
distribution 
  [33] 
τ ​H Transmission rate for an adult, 











τ ​B Transmission rate for an adult 
within the bubble 
0.5 ​τ ​H 1 ​τ ​H   
 
0.1 ​ τ​H 
 
assumption 
 Relative transmissibility of a 
child and older adult vs adults 
1 and 1 0.64 and 2.9 [8,53] 
 Relative susceptibility of a child 0.5 and 1 0.79 and 1.25 [53] 
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and older adult vs adults 
 Infection fatality rate  In 10y age 
bands 
 [39] 
R​e Net reproduction number 0.8 0.7, 0,9 [44] 











R​e ​given τ​H 
 
 
Constructing the synthetic population from census data 
 
We used data from the 2011 census of England and Wales (available on request from the Office 
for National Statistics as dataset CT1088) to construct a distribution of age-stratified household 
compositions in terms of ten-year age bands. Each household composition consisted of the 
number of individuals in each age band belonging to the household. We assigned probabilities 
to each composition observed in the census data based on the frequency of its appearance, 
and then used these probabilities to construct our simulated household populations. This gave 
us a synthetic population whose age structure was comparable with that of England and Wales 
and whose household compositions reflected the observed correlations between the ages of 
household occupants. In particular, this formulation should realistically capture the generational 
structure of households in England and Wales, which we expect to be an important factor in 
transmission across age classes. The data available to us covered households containing six 
individuals or fewer. Ten-year age band data is not publicly available from the ONS for larger 
households. Households of size six or less account for 98.2% of the households in England and 
Wales, and contain 97.8% of their combined population, so that the loss accuracy induced by 
this cutoff is likely to be minimal. 
 
 
Supplementary tables and figures 
 
Table S4 ​: Estimated reproduction number for the considered scenarios under the assumption 
that all eligible households pair up and thereby form exclusive social bubbles, under our base 
parameterisation.  
# Scenario description Reproduction number, assuming SAR​HH ​= 
10% 20% 40% 
C1 Comparator 1 (Baseline):  
Current lockdown with all 
households adhering to the 
lockdown rules 
0.8 0.8 0.8 
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C2 Comparator 2: 
Unclustered fixed additional 
contacts, population force of 
infection matched to Scenario 6 
0.93 1.14 1.66 
C3 Comparator 3: 
Unclustered varying additional 
contacts, population force of 
infection matched to Scenario 6 
0.95 1.16 1.82 
1 Allowing all households with primary 
school age children to pair up 
0.83  0.85 0.95 
2 Allowing all households with children 
of any age to pair up 
0.83 0.90 1.03 
3 All single occupancy households to 
link up with other single occupancy 
households 
0.84 0.85 0.88 
4 All single occupancy households to 
link up with any other household 
0.90 1.00 1.11 
5 Scenarios 1 and 3 0.84 0.90 1.01 
6 All households pair up 0.95  1.11 1.34 
 
Table S5 ​: Estimated increase in fatalities in generations 5 to 9 for the considered scenarios 
under the assumption that all eligible households pair up and thereby form exclusive social 
bubbles and that transmission rates, under our base parameterisation. 
# Scenario description Increase in fatalities, assuming SAR​HH ​= 
10% 20% 40% 
C1 Comparator 1 (Baseline):  
Current lockdown with all 
households adhering to the 
lockdown rules 
1 1 1 
C2 Comparator 2: 
Unclustered fixed additional 
contacts, population force of 
infection matched to Scenario 6 
2.65 8.45 40.64 
C3 Comparator 3: 
Unclustered varying additional 
contacts, population force of 
2.78 9.43 46.87 
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infection matched to Scenario 6 
1 Allowing all households with primary 
school age children to pair up 
1.18  1.49 2.57 
2 Allowing all households with children 
of any age to pair up 
1.20 1.98 4.09 
3 All single occupancy households to 
link up with other single occupancy 
households 
1.20 1.39 1.90 
4 All single occupancy households to 
link up with any other household 
2.05 3.77 6.98 
5 Scenarios 1 and 3 1.39 2.24 4.14 






Supplementary Figure S2:​ The impact of uptake on ​R​ and fatality. Here we consider the impact varying levels of 
uptake has on the reproduction number, ​R​, and the fatality incidence ratio. We consider this for our 
baseline parameters, at varying levels of transmission across bubble contacts (​τ ​B ​=  τ ​H​ in blue, ​τ​B ​= 0.5 
τ ​H​ ​in red, ​τ​B ​= 0.1 τ​H​ in green). We observe that R scales approximately linearly with uptake, with the 
gradient of increase dependent on transmission rate across bubble contacts. 
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Supplementary Figure S3: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario 2. The color coding is based on factors 
determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 
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Supplementary Figure S4: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario 3. The color coding is based on factors 
determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 




Supplementary Figure S5: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario 4. The color coding is based on factors 
determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 
of being equal across households. 
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Supplementary Figure S6: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario 5. The color coding is based on factors 
determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 
of being equal across households. 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S7: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario 6. The color coding is based on factors 
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determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R ​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 
of being equal across households. 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S8: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario C2. The color coding is based on factors 
determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R ​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 
of being equal across households. 
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Supplementary Figure S9: ​The tornado diagram shows a univariate sensitivity analysis on the expected increase in 
fatalities and the net reproduction number for scenario C3. The color coding is based on factors 
determining higher risk (orange) and lower risk (blue) for scenario 1. The base case estimate is 
indicated through the dashed grey vertical line. The sensitivity scenarios are: transmission across 
individuals of households sharing a bubble is 90% or 0% lower than that within a household instead of 
50%, the relative susceptibility to infection of children and older adults compared to adults is 79% and 
125% while the relative transmissibility is 64% and 290%, the secondary attack rate in the household is 
10% or 40% instead of 20%, ​R ​e​ ​is 0.7 or 0.9 instead of 0.8, that 50% of bubbles do not adhere to the 
recommendations but pair up to bubbles with four households rather than perfect adherence and that 
the risk of a household to get infected from the community is proportional to the household size instead 
of being equal across households. 
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